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ABSTRACT 
 
The observable universe is necessarily hospitable for life. There are indications, however, that 
the laws of physics and cosmological parameters need not take the form and values observed, 
and if they were slightly different life could not exist. A common approach to this fine tuning 
problem is to propose a cosmos with an ensemble of domains, mostly inhospitable for life. A 
Bayesian method is used to show that this hypothesis is more credible than a homogeneous 
fine tuned universe. This conclusion is straightforward for a finite ensemble, but can be 
extended to an infinite ensemble by applying a formulation of the Principle of Mediocrity. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Cosmology involves several challenges 
that distinguish it from other disciplines. It 
concerns domains that are inaccessible to 
observation, it confronts the notion of 
infinity as an expression of reality, and it 
is strongly influenced by observer 
selection effects. Observer selection means 
the apparent properties of the universe are 
selected in that they must be such as to 
permit the emergence of observers. What 
is observed, therefore, may be very 
unrepresentative of what exists. 
 
Despite strong agreement between theory 
and observation in modern cosmology, 
critical gaps in knowledge remain. These 
include the initiation of the big bang, the 
nature of dark matter and dark energy, and 
whether the universe is finite or infinite. 
Also, if the properties of the universe were 
slightly different, no life could exist. 
 
This last issue is known as the fine tuning 
problem, which was first noted in the 
coincidences of stellar nucleosynthesis 
(Hoyle, 1965) and subsequently in a 
broader cosmological context Carr & 
Rees, 1979). It concerns the fact that the 
physical laws and cosmological 
parameters are not constrained to fall 
within the range that permits observers to 
emerge. If these laws apply everywhere, 
this circumstance requires explanation. 
 
A common approach to the fine tuning 
problem is to propose a cosmos that is far 
larger than that observed, much of it being 
unsuitable for observers. In this so called 
multiverse, the local region has properties 
that permit observers and so appears fine 
tuned. The entire multiverse, however, is 
deemed not to be fine tuned. 
 
The multiverse concept continues an 
enduring trend in cosmology. Previous 
anthropocentric views (geocentric, 
heliocentric, galactocenteric) all proved to 
be false. Multiverse cosmology takes this a 
step further by removing any central status 
from the entire Hubble volume. The 
properties of domains beyond the horizon 
may differ, but all observers must be 
located in regions where the properties 
permit observers to exist. 
 
Multiverse cosmology has been criticized 
for being unfalsifiable, and hence 
unscientific. It is tempting to dismiss the 
concept on these grounds, but a lack of 
falsifiability does not mean an idea is 
false. To dismiss unfalsifiable hypotheses 
is to impose another anthropocentric 
condition on the universe. Falsifiable 
theories are naturally desirable because 
their credence increases in response to 
ever more stringent attempts to reject 
them. If this is not possible, however, an 
alternative approach is required. 
 
Multiverse cosmologies are addressed here 
by using Bayes' theorem to determine their 
credence relative to a homogeneous fine 
tuned universe. Key to this approach is the 
treatment of observer selection effects by 
the Self Sampling Assumption (SSA) 
(Bostrom, 2002). This requires that the 
observer be regarded as a random member 
of the set of all observers. Multiverse 
cosmology is shown to be more credible 
than a homogeneous fine tuned universe, 
and the strength of this inference is given 
by the degree of fine tuning. 
 
This result is direct for a finite multiverse, 
but less so for an infinite ensemble. One 
problem is that observers may occur due to 
random fluctuations of matter, albeit with 
extremely low probability. Such 'freak' 
observers are not confined to domains that 
permit observers to emerge naturally, and 
may be more numerous than ntural 
observers if observer-supporting universes 
are sufficiently rare. This makes it 
impossible to treat observer selection 
effects by applying SSA. 
 
To address this problem a Principle of 
Mediocrity is proposed whereby a section 
of the the multiverse containing the 
observer is unexceptional if viewed on a 
sufficiently large scale. A weak form of 
this principle is used to show that 
observer-supporting members of the 
ensemble comprise an infinite subset with 
non-zero measure. This allows freak 
observers to be neglected, and ensures the 
ratio of prior probabilities is non-singular, 
thereby extending the result to the case of 
an infinite multiverse. 
 
 
2. Multiple Universe 
Cosmologies 
 
The multiverse concept is not founded 
solely upon the fine tuning problem. 
Inflation cosmology and quantum theory 
provide a strong basis for a heterogenous 
ensemble of universes (Linde, 2007). 
String theory, for example, suggests the 
existence of a vast number of domains 
with different physical laws depending on 
the geometry of the compact dimensions. 
 
A four level taxonomy of multiverse 
cosmologies has been proposed (Tegmark, 
2007). The first level includes the infinite 
ergodic universe, which is a consequence 
of chaotic inflation. This comprises many 
Hubble volumes with all possible initial 
conditions but homogeneous laws. 
 
The level 2 multiverse envisages many 
replications of level 1, viewed as ‘bubbles' 
in an inflating medium where inflation has 
ceased. Spontaneous symmetry breaking 
results in different laws and cosmological 
parameters in each such bubble. 
 
Level 3 is motivated by the many-worlds 
interpretation of quantum mechanics. 
Every quantum state of the universe exists 
simultaneously, rather than colapsing to a 
single state upon making an observation. 
This adds no content beyond level 2, the 
main distinction being that the ensemble 
exists in an infinite dimensional Hilbert 
space rather than real physical space. 
 
Finally, the level 4 multiverse is motivated 
by a principle of mathematical democracy, 
in which all possible mathematical 
structures exist in reality. This derives 
from philosophical considerations, and 
serves to close the multiverse hierarchy. 
 
The key feature of all multiverse models is 
the variation of physical laws. If the laws 
were homogeneous, with variation only in 
initial conditions, the concept offers no 
resolution to the fine tuning problem. This 
is the case for the infinite ergodic universe 
at level 1. In general, however, the laws 
may vary over distances larger than the 
Hubble scale to provide the necessary 
inhomogeneity. The level 2 multiverse 
envisages disjoint domains with different 
physical laws. For the purpose of resolving 
the fine tuning problem, it is of no concern  
whether the variation is continuous or 
discrete. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Bayesian Inference and 
the Self Sampling Assumption 
 
Science progresses by enhancing the 
credence of a hypothesis in response to 
evidence. When an observer's existence 
depends on the hypothesis in question, 
observer selection effects must be taken 
into account. In cosmology this is 
expressed by the Anthropic Principle (AP) 
(Carter, 1974; Barrow & Tipler 1986) 
originally stated by Carter as ...what we 
can expect to observe must be restricted by 
the conditions necessary for our presence 
as observers. 
 
Various forms of AP have been proposed. 
Some have been criticized for being 
tautological or offering no prescription for 
application. These concerns have been 
addressed by re-casting AP as the Self 
Sampling Assumption (SSA) stated as 
follows: One should reason as if one were 
a random sample from the set of all 
observers in one's reference class 
(Bostrom, 2002). 
 
This approach avoids tautology and 
indicates a methodology for expressing the 
probabilistic connection between theory 
and observation. It provides a means to 
determine observational consequences 
given theories about the distribution of 
observers. The intent of SSA is to treat an 
observation as a random element of the 
set, or reference class, of all comparable 
observations. This has been formalized by 
Bostram in an observation equation giving 
the probability of a hypothesis h as a 
consequence of evidence e. 
 
No attempt is made here to apply the 
observation equation directly to specific 
multiverse models. Current prescriptions 
lack the detail required to calculate the 
distribution of observers and construct the 
observer reference class. Instead, Bayes' 
theorem and SSA are used to determine 
the credence of a composite multiverse 
hypothesis relative to a fine tuned universe 
with homogeneous properties that permit 
observers. 
 
 
4. A Thought Experiment 
  
To illustrate the rationale, consider an 
observer with no knowledge of the outside 
world. She finds herself in a room with 
one feature, a four digit number N equal 
the year of her birth. What can be deduced 
about the nature of such rooms? 
 
Two alternate hypotheses may be 
considered. In the first hypothesis (H1) 
there are many rooms, each with the same 
four digit number. An alternate hypothesis 
(H2) has many rooms with an ensemble of 
different numbers. The evidence E is that 
this room has a number equal to the 
observer’s birth year. 
 
Assuming no causal relationship between 
room numbers and observers, it would be 
a coincidence for all rooms to have a 
feature specific to the observer. The ratio 
of prior probabilities P(H1) / P(H2) = 10-4 
if in H2 all four digit numbers are equally 
probable. The conditional probability of E 
under each hypothesis is P(E/H1) = 1 and 
P(E/H2) = 10-4. Then by Bayes’ theorem: 
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Thus the evidence E offers no reason to 
favor either hypothesis. 
 
With no causal relationship between 
rooms and observers, no observer 
selection effect is involved. Such an effect 
may be introduced by specifying that an 
occupant can survive only in a room with 
the property that its number is equal to the 
year of her birth. All observers must then 
find themselves in such a room. 
 
In this case it remains a coincidence that 
all rooms have a feature specific to the 
observer, so P(H1) / P(H2) = 10-4 as before. 
Applying SSA with a reference class of all 
observers in all rooms, the conditional 
probability of E under H1 or H2 is unity, 
and hence: 
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When observers are constrained to occupy 
rooms that are amenable to their existence, 
therefore, the ensemble hypothesis is 
favored over one in which all rooms are 
identical. 
 
 
5. The Multiverse 
Hypotheses 
 
The observable universe appears to be fine 
tuned. There is dispute over the degree to 
which this is the case, but it is widely 
accepted that at least some cosmological 
parameters are not constrained to take 
their observed values, and the allowed 
range of values is much greater than that 
which permits the emergence of observers. 
Fine tuning may be quantified by a 
parameter F, the probability of selecting 
by chance properties that permit the 
emergence of observers. 
 
Now consider cosmological hypotheses 
H1, H2 and evidence E as follows: 
 
H1: Physical laws and cosmological 
parameters are homogeneous and 
permit observers. 
 
H2: Physical laws and cosmological 
parameters occur in a finite 
ensemble M with a non-empty 
subset S that permit observers. 
 
E: The observed universe permits 
observers 
 
Following the method of the thought 
experiment, cosmology H1 is fine tuned 
but H2 is not, and the ratio of prior 
probabilities P(H1) / P(H2) = F. Applying 
SSA with the reference class of all 
observers in the ensemble, the conditional 
probability of E under H1 or H2 is unity, 
since in H2 all observers are in an element 
of S. Then by Bayes’ theorem: 
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If the observable universe is fine tuned 
with F<<1, the evidence that it permits 
observers strongly favors the ensemble 
hypothesis H2, and the greater the fine 
tuning the greater the inference favoring 
H2 over H1. This argument holds for a 
finite ensemble because the existence of 
the observable universe means that S is not 
empty, and the ratio of prior probabilities 
is not singular. 
 
 
6. The Infinite Multiverse 
 
There is no reason to expect the multiverse 
ensemble to be finite. Indeed a countably 
infinite ensemble is a more natural model. 
The previous analysis does not hold for an 
infinite ensemble for two reasons. Firstly, 
if the set of observer-supporting elements 
is finite, or infinite with zero measure, the 
ratio of prior probabilities is singular and 
the relative credence of the two 
hypotheses is indeterminate. Secondly, 
freak observers may occur in any element 
of M that contains matter, which may be 
more numerous than those that permit 
observers to emerge by normal processes. 
Consequently, the assumption that all 
observers occur in observer-permitting 
elements of the ensemble is false. 
 
To deal with the infinite ensemble it is 
necessary to show that the measure of S is 
non-zero. With no established theory of 
universe formation, however, it is not 
possible to determine the probability that a 
given element of M has properties that 
permit observers, and hence no way to 
determine the measure of S. 
 
The Principle of Mediocrity is commonly 
accepted in cosmology. This holds broadly 
that a region containing the observer is not 
special if viewed on a sufficiently large 
scale. Stated differently, the local region is 
statistically unexceptional within the set of 
all similar regions at large scales. This 
principle may also be applied to the 
multiverse. The observable universe is 
special in that it has properties that permit 
observers, but a large finite section of the 
multiverse, containing the observable 
universe, should be unexceptional within 
the set of all similar sections. 
 
 
Consider a partition of the multiverse into 
a series of disjoint finite domains Pi. Each 
Pi contains mi elements of M and si ≤ mi 
elements of S. The proportion of observer-
supporting elements ρi = si/mi satisfies a 
distribution function F(ρi) = P(ρj≤ρi); j≠i. 
The local universe may be assumed to be 
in P1 and the Principle of Mediocrity 
defined as follows: 
 
For partition Pi and variable ρi with 
distribution F(ρi), F(ρ1) ≠ 0 or 1. 
 
This definition requires that the partition 
element containing the observable 
universe is unexceptional in the 
distribution F(ρi). In fact it requires only 
that ρ1 not be so exceptional that the set of 
more extreme members has measure zero. 
 
If the multiverse satisfies this Principle of 
Mediocrity, S must be infinite. To see this 
assume S is finite and choose P1 large 
enough so that it contains all elements of 
S. Then ρ1 ≠ 0 and ρi = 0 for i≠1, hence 
F(ρ1) = 1. This contradicts the definition, 
and the assumption that S is finite is false. 
 
The Principle of Mediocrity also implies 
that the S has non-zero measure. Since P1 
is finite and contains at least one observer-
supporting member, ρ1≠0. By definition 
F(ρ1) ≠ 0 or 1, hence P(ρj≤ρ1) = A with A ≠ 
0 or 1. A lower bound L on the measure of 
S is given by L = A.0 + (1-A).ρ1 ≠ 0. 
 
The simplest assumption concerning the 
composition of M is a steady state infinite 
multiverse with no natural dimension or 
timescale. Individual elements of the 
ensemble may exist for different periods, 
but the overall composition does not vary. 
In a steady state multiverse a suitable 
observer reference class is the set of all 
observers at any epoch. For a non-steady 
multiverse it is necessary to include 
observers at all epochs, but this distinction 
is not critical for the Bayesian argument. 
 
Returning to the calculation of the 
credence of multiverse and non-multiverse 
cosmologies, consider hypotheses H1, H2 
and evidence E as follows: 
 
H1: Physical laws and cosmological 
parameters are homogeneous and 
permit observers. 
 
H2: Physical laws and cosmological 
parameters occur in an infinite 
ensemble M with subset S of non-
zero measure that permit 
observers. 
 
E: The observed universe permits 
observers. 
 
Again cosmology H1 is fine tuned and 
cosmology H2 is not, and the ratio of prior 
probabilities P(H1) / P(H2) = F where F is 
the fine tuning parameter. Applying SSA 
with the reference class of all observers in 
the ensemble, the conditional probability 
of E under H1 or H2 is unity as all 
observers in H2 are in elements of S. Freak 
observers may be neglected due to their 
extreme improbability, and the fact that 
the measure of S is non-zero. Then by 
Bayes' theorem: 
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Thus fine tuning favors a heterogenous 
multiverse over a fine tuned homogeneous 
universe, and the strength of this inference 
is given by the fine tuning parameter. 
 
 
6. Conclusions and 
Implications 
 
The result here rests on three assumptions. 
Firstly, that probability theory may be 
applied to the credence of hypotheses, and 
the Self Sampling Assumption is a valid 
way to treat observer selection effects. 
Secondly, that a homogeneous or hetero-
geneous cosmos are a priori equally 
likely, but fine tuning biases the prior 
probability to a heterogeneous multiverse. 
Finally, the multiverse obeys a Principle of 
Mediocrity such that a section containing 
the observer is unexceptional if sampled 
on a sufficiently large scale. 
 
 
The first assumption is widely accepted, 
the second is strongly supported by theory 
and observations, and the third is plausible 
but cannot be experimentally validated. 
 
The approach followed is to define two 
classes of cosmologies; one in which the 
physical laws are homogeneous and permit 
observers, and another in which an 
ensemble of domains spans the possible 
laws. Two hypotheses are then defined 
according to whether the cosmos conforms 
to one class or the other. Bayes' theorem is 
applied to determine the relative credence 
of the two hypotheses. 
 
Note that these hypotheses do not include 
all possible cosmologies. Models in which 
the entire multiverse is fine tuned are not 
addressed as they offer no resolution of the 
fine tuning problem. Also, cosmologies 
involving the agency of intelligence are 
excluded by the tacit assumption that 
elements of the multiverse ensemble are 
generated by natural processes, and thus 
without planning. Any conscious design 
mechanism makes the fine tuning problem 
moot, but at the cost of introducing the 
larger problem of explaining the existence 
and mechanism of primordial intelligence. 
 
Note that the intercession of intelligence 
does not imply supernatural phenomena. It 
has been proposed that life may advance to 
the extent that it achieves the capability to 
create universes and select their properties 
to favor the subsequent emergence of life, 
indicating a process akin to universal 
natural selection (Harrison, 1995). 
 
The present analysis does not address 
these speculations. It indicates only the 
relative likelihood of two hypotheses. The 
conclusion may be stated as follows: If the 
observable universe is fine tuned, a 
heterogenous multiverse is more likely 
than a homogeneous universe. 
 
The strength of the inference favoring the 
multiverse is given by the degree of fine 
tuning. It may prove difficult to determine 
this parameter until a full theory of physics 
is available, which allows calculation of 
the distribution of cosmological properties. 
If the chance that these properties support 
observers is small, indicating strong fine 
tuning, this constitutes evidence favoring a 
heterogenous multiverse. 
 
The multiverse hypothesis may never be 
subjected to experimental falsification. 
While the idea has substantial explanatory 
power, it may yield no direct observational 
consequences. This suggests it may be 
regarded as a discipline of philosophy 
rather than science. Nevertheless, there are 
sound reasons to suggest it may be true. 
 
Perhaps the most significant implication of 
the multiverse concept is that it highlights 
a limitation of science itself. If the quest 
for a full theory of physics succeeds, and 
explains all phenomena in the observable 
universe, it may be only a special case 
from a vast ensemble of such theories. The 
existence and properties of such other 
realms may remain matters of speculation, 
forever beyond the reach of experiment or 
observation. 
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